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(L. A. No. 21327. In Bank.

May 15, 1950.J

BEVERLY GARDNER, Appellant, v. JONATHAN CLUB
(a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Innkeepers-Liability for Guest's Property.-Under Civ. Code,
§§ 1859, 1860, as amended, an innkeeper's liability for loss of
or injury to the goods of his guests is that of a depositary for
hire, and to impose liability on him for such loss the loss must
be caused by his own negligence or dishonesty or that of
his employees.
[SI] BallmentB-Burden of Proof.-If a bailor alleges and proves
the deposit of property with the bailee, a demand therefor,
and the failure of the bailee to redeliver, the burden of proof
rests on the bailee to explain his failure.
[8] Id.-Liability of Bailee-Limitation of Liabillty.-If a bailee
fails to prove that the loss of property did Dot result from his
own negligence or dishonesty or that of his employees, he is
liable for that loss under Civ. Code, §§ 1859, 1860, but his
liability is limited to the amounts specified in the statute unless
he has assumed a greater liability or has himself stolen the
property.

[1] See 14 Oal.Jur. 322; 28 Am.Jur. 585.
McK. Dig. References: [11 Innkeepers, § 4; [2] Bailments, § 21;
[3] Bailments, § 9; [4-9,11,12] Innkeepers, § 4(3); [10] Bailments,
§ 7; (13) lDnkeepers, §7(4).
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[4] Innkeepers-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on
Liability.-NdLher section ]859 nor section 18GO of the Civil
Cod", lil))itiug liability of an innkeeper to specified amounts, is
illappli('nble to losses resulting from theft by an employee of
the innkeeper.
[5] Id.-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liability.
-Civ. Code, ~§ 18;:)9, J8GO, limiting liability of innkeepers to
specified amouuts, lire applicable as well to losses resulting
from theft by employees as to losses from negligence.
[6] Id.-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liability.
-Civil Code, § ]860, does not guarantee a minimum recovery
of $250 in every case in which property deposited in a hotel
safe is lost, and to recover judgment for $250, a plaintiff must
prove that the deposited property wus worth that much and
that the innkeeper was info1'lOed or had reason to know of
that fact.
[7] Id.-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liability.
-A check which was detached from a sealed envelope containing $5,500 when II guest hunded it to the desk clerk of a
club to place in the club's safe, and which was given by the
clerk to the guest, and which provided that the check was to
be signed only when the envelope was called for in the presence of the clerk on duty, was not a receipt within the meaning
of Civ. Code, § 1860, for the contents of the envelope, but
was merely an identification check by which the guest could
prove his title to t.he envelope, and his assignee's recovery
was therefore properly limited to $250.
[8] ld.-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liability.
-Civil Code, §§ 1859, 1860, were designed to cover an innkeeper's liability for all artieIes of personal property carried
by his guests, and should a guest wish protection in excess of
the statutory limitation, he must declare the value of his
property to give the innkeeper an opportunity to confirm the
estimate of value for protection of the property.
[9] ld.-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liability.
-With respect to goods remaining in the possession of a guest,
the Legislature (Ci\'. Code, § 1859) required written consent
on the part of the innkeeper to assume a greater liability,
while as to articles deposited in the safe (Civ. Code, § 1860),
a written receipt for specifie goods of a declared value in excess
of the statutory limitation is the equivalent of the written
assumption of a greater liability. This construction is consistent with Civ. Code, § 1840, limiting the liability of the
bailee to the apparent value of the article unless the depositor
informs him that it has greater "alue.
[10] Bailments-LiabiIity of Bailee.-A builee will ordinarily give
a depositor a check for the identification of an article deposited
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with him, and such a check cannot reasonably be construed
as an acknowledgment of the receipt of an article of a specific
value when the bailee is not informed of tbat value by tbe
depositor.
[11] Innkeepers-Liability for Guest's Property-Limitations on
Liability.-By requiring a written receipt as an acknowledgment of having received goods or money delivered, tbe Legislature in Civ. Code, § 1859, clearly intended an acknowledgment
tbat a specific item was received witb awareness of its nature
and value.
[12] Id.-Liabllity for Guest's Property-Limitations on Liabilit)'.
-Tbe receipt in writing required by Civ. Code, § 1860, in order
to impose a greater liability on an innkeeper must be for an
article worth more than $250, and this requirement is not
satisfied by the mere acknowledgment of an envelope received
without knowledge or information of its contents or their
value.
[IS] Id.-Actions-Judgment.-In an action to recover money
deposited in a sealed envelope with the desk clerk at a club
for safekeeping in the club's safe, a summary judgment for
plaintiff limiting defendant's liability to $250 was proper
wbere the check given the guest for the envelope did not constitute "a receipt in writing therefor," within the meaning of
Civ. Code, § 1860, and no triable issue of damages was presented.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Harold B. Landreth, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover money deposited with an innkeeper for
safekeeping. Summary judgment for plaintiff limiting defendant's liability to $250, affirmed.
Murchison & Myers, R. Bruce Marchison, John B. Myers
and Claude B. Cumming for Appellant.
Fulcher & Wynn, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, P. C. Sterry and
C. G. Wynn for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff, as assignee of Lambert H. Polderman, brought this action to recover $5,500 allegedly contained
in an envelope delivered to defendant for safekeeping and not
returned on demand. Defendant moved for summary judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $250 on the ground that its

)
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liability was limited to that amount by Civil Code sections
1840, 1859, and 1860.· The motion was granted and plaintiff
appeals from the judgment entered thereon.
Plaintiff's assignor was a resident member of defendant
club, which rents rooms to members and guests. Pursuant
to Civil Code, section 1860, defendant maintains a fireproof
safe and has posted the prescribed notices. On June 18, 1947,
Polderman delivered a sealed envelope (allegedly containing
$5,500) to defendant's desk clerk with the request that it be
placed in the safe. The envelope had printed on it the following:
"A Check
1781
This check to be signed when
package is deposited.
In accepting this envelope and contents for safekeeping, we
assume no liability other than that provided for in the Inn
Keeper's Act of this state, which has limited our liability so
that in no event can we be liable for more than the amount
specified in said Act.
The employee accepting this envelope has no authority to
accept same if the contents are valued at more than the amount
specified in said Act.
The contents of this envelope do not exceed a value of $Ii---Signature of Depositor
19Received by - - - - - - - - Date
Do NOT DETACH UNTIL PACKAGE Is CALLED FOR
Delivery only to owner after signature on Duplicate check' B'
is witnessed and compared."
Polderman signed his name on the envelope, but did not
indicate the value of its contents in the space designated for
*Civil Code, § 1840: •• The liabilit1 of a depositary for negligence
cannot exceed the amount which he is informed by the depositor, or
has reason to suppose, the thing deposited to be worth."
Civil Code, § 1859: "The liability of an innkeeper, hotel keeper • • .
or lodging house keeper, for losses of or injuries to personal property,
is that of a depositary for hire; provided, however, that in no eass
shall such liability exceed the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for
each trunk and its contents, fifty dollars ($50) for each valise or
traveling bag and contents, ten dollars ($10) for each box, bundle or
package and· contents, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for all
other personal property of any kind, unless he shall have consented in
writing with the owner thereof to assume a greater liability."
Ch'il Code, ~ 1860: ., If an innkeeper, hotel keeper . . . or lodging
house keeper, keeps a fireproof safe and gives notice to a guest .•. or
lod&er. either personally or 117 puttine up a priated notice ill a prombl_

)
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that purpose. The clerk took the envelope and detached and
gave Polderman the "B" check which provided:
"B Check
1781
This check to be signed only when
package is called for in the presence of the Clerk on duty.
Signature of Depositor
Delivered by - - - - - - - - Date - - - 19 Package will be delivered only to party originally depositing
it, whose signature appears on duplicate check on package."
On September 4, 1947, Polderman presented the "B"
check to defendant and requested the envelope, but defendant
failed to return it to him. Polderman then assigned his
claim to plaintiff for coJll'ction. Defendant's liability is controlled by the statutes governing innkeepers, for even the
" A" check signed by Polderman made that liability coextensive with that "provided for in the Inn Keeper's Act
of this state."
"The issue to be determined by the trial court in consideration of a motion (for summary judgment] is whether or not
(plaintiff] has presented any facts which give rise to a triable
issue . . . and not to pass upon or determine the issue itself,
that is, the true facts in the case." (Eagle Oil & Refining Co.
v. Prentice, 19 Ca1.2d 553, 555 (122 P.2d 264] ; Walsk v. Walsk,
18 Cal.2d 439, 441 [116 P.2d 62] ; U. S. Fidelity & Gtusr. Co.
v. Sullivan, 93 Cal.App.2d 559, 561 [209 P.2d 429].) H the
complaint alleges facts that present a triable issue, a summary judgment is improper.
[1] Before the amendment of sections 1859 and 1860 to
substantially their present form in 1895, an innkeeper, like
a common carrier, was liable as an insurer for loss of or
injury to the goods of his guests. (Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cftl.
221, 227.) Under the statutes as amended, however, his liability is that of a depositary for hire. To impose liability
plaee iD the office or room occupied by the guest ••• or lodger, that
he keeps such a eafe and will not be liable for [speei1itld articles of
personal property] or other artieles of unusual value and small compass,
unless placed therein, be i8 not liable; except 80 far as his own acts
shall contributll thereto, for any loss of or injury to such articles, if
not deposited with him to be placed tllerein, nor in any case for more
than the sum of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for any or all such
property . . . unless h(' shull lla\"e given a receipt ila writiD, therefor to
auch auest ... IIr lod,er."
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on him for loss of the property of his guests, the loss must be
caused by his own negligencE' or dishonesty or that of his
employees. [2J If 8 bailor al1e~es and proves the deposit
of property with the bail{'e, a demand therefor; and the failure
of the bailee to redE'Jiver, the burden of proof rests upon the
bailee to explain his failure. (George v. Bekifls Van cfc Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 839-841 [205 P.2d 1037] ; U Dritle cfc
Tour, Ltd v. System A1do Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal.App.2d supp.
782, 784 [71 P.2d 354] ; Cussen v. Southern Calif. Savings
Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 537. [65 P. 1099, 85 Am.St.Rep. 221];
Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683, 687 [77 P. 664].) [3) If he
falls to. prove that thE' loss did not result from the aforementioned cause, he is liable for that loss under sections 1859
and 1860, but his liability is limited to the specified amounts
unless he has assumed a greater liability or has himself stolen
the property. Since defendant is a ('orporation it can act only
through its employees. By its motion for summary judgment
for plaintiff for $250, defendant conceded that the loss resulted
from the negligence or theft of its employees. Section 18601
limits its liability therefor unless it gave a receipt in writing i
for the contents of the envelope, and summary judgment for
that amount "'as proper unless sueh a receipt was given.
\
[4] It is contended, however, that if the loss resulted from
theft by an employee, the $250 limitation is inapplicable, and
plaintiff is therefore entitled to a trial on the issue of theft.
We cannot agree. Section 1860 unequivocally limits liability
for loss "in any case" to $250; it does not except losses caused
by employees' dishonesty. The same is true of the provision
of section 1859 that "in no case" shall liability exceed the
specified amounts. NeithE'r statute furnishes support for the
contention that the limitation was not designed to apply to
losses resulting from theft by an employee of the innkeeper.
The New York Court of Appeal has interpreted a similar
statute as limiting liability in all cases, including that of theft
by an employee, in which the property has been lost from the
possession of the bailee:
"The Appellate Division has decided that [the statute]
does not protect the defendant or limit its liability because
the jewelry was stolen by an employee of the defendant,
thereby limiting the effect of the section to eases where the
property of the guest placed with a hotel for safekeepmg in
a safe is stolen by some one not an employee of the hotel.
We cannot agree with that construction of the section. There
is nothing in the wording of the section which suggests such
I
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a limitation of its meaning . . . The purpose of the section is
to protect the hotel from an undisclosed liability . . .
"During the many years that a statute has been in existence
in this State limiting the liability of a hotel to a guest, no
case has been decided by this court indicating that such limited
liability did not exist in case the property of a guest deposited
for safekeeping was stolen from a hotel by an employee thereof.
Such a holding by this court would nullify the purpose of the
statute and be in conflict with the spirit and intent thereof.
"We do not hold that section 200 limits the liability of a
hotel to $250 where the value of the artieIes left for safekeeping
in a safe is not disclosed, and the articles are stolen by the
hotel keeper. Such a theft would be by the hotel keeper from
the guest and not a theft from the hotel keeper." (M~1lhiser
v. Beau Site Co., 251 N.Y. 290. 294-295 [167 N.E. 447] ; Goodwin v. Georgian Hotel 00., 197 Wash. 173, 184-186 [84 P.2d
681, 119 A.L.R. 788].)
[6] Sections 1859 and 1860 are designed to relieve the innkeeper from his insurer's responsibility, "to protect [him]
from an undisclosed liability" for the deposited property.
They are as applicable to losses resulting from theft by
employees as to losses from negligence. Theft by an employee
is often the cause of such losses (see, Millhiser v. Beau Site Co.,
251 N. Y. 290, 294 [167 N.E. 447] ; Muehlebach v. Paso Robles
Spring Hotel, 65 Cal.App. 634, 640 [225 P. 19]), and cannot
be excluded from the operation of sections 1859 and 1860
without vitiating their terms and purpose.
Muehlebach v. Paso Robles Spring Hotel, 65 Cal.App. 634
[225 P. 19], does not sustain a contrary conclusion. It was
there contended in support of a judgment for the defendant
innkeeper that section 1860 imposed no liability for the loss
of goods resulting from theft by the innkeeper's employee.
The court reversed the judgment, holding that section 1860
did not exempt the innkeeper from all liability for loss caused
by an employee's dishonesty. That case decided only that
the statutory imposition of liability was applicable to theft
by an employee, not that the limitation thereof was· not applicable. The court expressly stated that it did not decide
the applicability of the $250 limitation. (65 Cal.App. 634,
648.) It is clrar t113t the innkeeper is liable for loss caused
by his employ<,e's dishonesty. but that his liability is limited
by the' terms of srctions 18M} and 1860. Til "iew of defendant's
admission of liability by its motion for summary judgment,
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it is immaterial whether the loss resulted from theft or
negligence.
[6] It bears emphasis that section 1860 does not guarantee
a minimum recovery of $250 in every ease in which property
deposited in a hotel safe is lost. Section 1840 limits the
liability of the depositary to the amount it "is informed by
the depositor, or has reason to suppose, the thing deposited to
be worth." To recover judgment for $250, a plaintiff must
prove that the deposited property was worth that much and
that the innkeeper. wa~ informed or had reason to know of
that fact. In this ca!Oe, however, the question does not arise
because defendant waived the requirement of that proof by
moving for the summary judgment.
[7] Plaintiff. contends that the "B" check is a receipt
within the meaning of section 1860 and that therefore thf're
is no limitation 011 defendant's liability. We have concluded
that the "B" check was not a receipt within the meaning of
section 1860 for the contents of the envelope but was merely
an identification check by which Polderman could prove his
title to the envelope and that plaintiff's recovery was therefore
properly limited to $250.
[8] Sections 1859 and 1860 were designed to cover an
innkeeper's liability for all articles of personal property
carried by his guests. They have a common purpose and must
be read together. In each section, the reason for the exception
to the liability limitation is clear. Should a guest wish protection in excess of the statutory limitation, he must declare the
value of his property to give the innkeeper an opportunity to
confirm the estimate of value. He can then refuse to assume
the greater liability or if he assumes it he can take proper
precautions for the protection of the property. Liability in
excess of the statutory limitation is thus based on the innkeeper's agreement to assume it. (Hoffman v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 99 Cal.App. 436, 438 [278 P. 891] ; Providence Washingt(m Ins. Co. v. Hotel Marysville, Inc., 60 Ca1.App.2d 338, 344
[140 P.2d 698] ; Homan v. Burkhart, 108 Cal.App. 363 [291
P. 624] ; Wilson v. Crown Transfer &: Storage Co., 201 Cal.
701, 714 [258 P. 596] ; Goodwin v. Georgian Hotel Co., 197
Wash. 173, 184 [84 P.2d 681, 119 A.L.R. 7S8) ; Stoll v. Almon
C. Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551,559 [138 A. 479, 53 A.L.R. 1M2] ;
Horton v. Terminal Hotel &- A. Co., 114 Mo.App. 357, 362
[89 S.W. ::Jo3] ; Pfennig v. Roosevelt Ilotel, Itlc., (La.App.)
31 So.2d 31,34; Whitehouse v. Pickett. [1908] A.C. 357, 365.)
Section 1859 unequivocally provides that the innkeeper's Iia-

)
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bility is limited to the amount specificd, unless he consents
in writing to assume greater liability. Section 1859 covers
all articles brought into the hotel or inn by a guest. Section
1860, relating to small articles of unusual value that are easily
lost or misplaced, affords the innkeeper additional protection
against liability for Joss. If he keeps a safE' and posts the
prescribed notices, he is exempted from all liability for such
articles unless they are placed in his safe. If he does not keep
a safe, section 1859 governs his liability. With rCRpect to
articles placed in the safe, the Legislature demonstrated its
intention to apply the same limitation on liability, with the
same exception, and for the same purpose as that embodied
in section 1859. The "receipt in writing" exception of section
1860 requires the same acknowledgment of greater liability
as that required by section 1859. (Providenoe Washington
Ins. 00. v. Hotel MarysviUe, Inc., 60 Cal.App.2d 838, 847,
348 [140 P.2d 698J.)
[9J The reason is clear for the variation in the terms
"consented in writing" in section 1859, and "receipt in writing" in section 1860. Section 1859 refers to the property of
guests remaining in their possession in the rooms of the inn
or hotel; section 1860 refers to articles placed in the safe in
the possession of the innkeeper. One ordinarily gives a receipt
for goods delivered into his possession but not for goods remaining in the possession of another. As to the latter, therefore, the Legislature required written consent on the part of
the innkeeper to assume a greater liability; as to articles deposited in the safe, a written receipt for specific goods of a
declared value in excess of the statutory limitation is the
equivalent of the written assumption of a greater liability.
This eonstruction is clearly consistent with the provision
of Civil Code, section 1840, limiting the liability of the
bailee to the apparent value of the article unless the depositor
informs him that it has greater value. The written acknowledgment of the receipt of goods of a declared value in excess
of $250 would satisfy the information requirement of section
1840. If, however, plaintiff's construction were adopted, the
mere act of giving an identification check for a deposit of
unknown value would impose unlimited liability even though
the bailee was not "informed, or [had] reason to .suppose"
the property was worth more than the statutory limitation.
Plaintiff's construction would also render section 1860 meaningless. [10] A baUee will ordinarily give a depositor a

-)
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check for the identification of an article deposited with him.
Such a check cannot reasonably be construed as an acknowledgment of the receipt of an article of a specific value when the
bailee is not informed of that value by the depositor. Unless
"receipt in writing therefor" was meant to require more than
the bare acknowledgment of receiving something that inevitably accompanies the ordinary bailment, the statutory
limitation is completely nullified.
[11] Plaintiff contends, however, that the use of the term
"receipt" in section 1860 demonstrates a legislative intention
not to accomplish the same purpose by section 1860 as by section 1859. She invokes the definition of "receipt" in Gree,.
v. Los Angeles Athletic Club, 84 Cal.App. 272, 281 [258 P.
155] : "evidence of the ownership, delivery and identity of
the baggage." That definition makes "receipt" the equivalent of an identification check. Receipt, however, is more
accurately defined as "a writing acknowledging the taking or
receiving of goods or money delivered or paid." (Webster's
New Internat. Diet., p. 2077.) The distinction is readilyapparent between that definition and the definition of an identi·
fication check as "a ticket, certificate, or token, by which
ownership or title may be proved, or a thing or person may be
identified . . . as a check for a coat, hat, etc., . . . a baggage
check." (Webster's New Internat. Diet., p. 457.) By requiring a written receipt as an acknowledgment of having received
goods or money delivered, the Legislature clearly intended an
acknowledgment that a specific item was received with awareness of its nature and value. [12] Section 1860 refers to responsibility for articles worth more than $250, and requires
a "receipt in writing therefor" in order to impose a greater
liability. The receipt must therefore be for an article worth
more than $250. This requirement is not satisfied by the mere
acknowledgment of an envelope received without knowledge
or information of its contents or their value. There is as
much likelihood that an envelope would contain a will, bonds,
an insurance policy, a contract, newspaper clippings, as $5,500
in cash. The" B" check gave the depositor a means of identi.
fying the envelope; it could not be a receipt for whatever
it contained when the clerk was not informed what its contents were. (See Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. HoteZ
MarYS1)iUe, Inc., 60 Cal.App.2d 338, 348 [140 P.2d 698];
Goodwin v. Georgian Hotel Co., 197 Wash. 173, 180 [84 P.2d
(l8I, 119 A.L.R. 788] ; Kentucky Hotel, Inc. v. Cinoffi, 298
Ky. 88,91 [182 S.W.2d 27] ; NM'ris v. Manisckewitse B,.lHIiltIJer
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Central Hotel, Inc., 129 Misc. 329 [221 N.Y.S. 363, 364].)
Thc dictum in the Greer case is contrary to the terms and purpose of the statute and is disapproved.
[13J It is undisputed that defendant maintained a fireproof safe and posted the prescribed notices thereof, and that
plaintiff delivered personal property to defendant for deposit
in that safe without informing defendant of the character or
value of that property. Defendant by its motion for summary
judgment for plaintiff has eliminated any triable issue as to
its liability for loss of the property. Since we have concluded
that the "B" check given without information or reason to
know the value of that property does not constitute" a receipt
in writing therefor," defendant is liable only for $250 and
no triable issue of damages is presented. Summary judgment
in the present case is therefore proper.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., and Adams, J. pro
tem., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I disagree with the result reached by the majority of this
court. In order to reach that result, the majority hold that
the "B" check is not a receipt in writing as contemplated by
the provisions of section 1860 of the Civil Code.
Assume for the moment that the "A" check had been filled
in properly with the amount deposited, the date, signature of
depositor and the agent of the defendant who received it, and
that it was entirely in order. The "B" check was detached
from the envelope which comprised the "A" check and was
given to the bailor. It was not within the contemplation of the
parties that this check would be filled in until the depositor
had received that which he had left for safekeeping with the
bailee club, that is, the envelope containing the subject matter of the bailment. 11 the "A" check had been properly
filled in, and il the depositor had actual knowledge of the
contents of the envelope, would the bailee have given any
different kind of receipt! The majority hold that the "B"
check is not such a receipt "in writing" as is contemplated
by section 1860 of the Civil Code. The absurdity of tbis is
patent to anyone who has had experience in depositing valuables with a hotel for safekeeping. My experience has been
III C.Jd-U
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that the bailee who is cognizant of his duties will inquire
to the value of the article bailed, will then place it in an envelope of the proper size, and detach a receipt like the one in
the instant case, and then give the receipt to the bailor. Th~
code section makes no provision for any particular form of
receipt. As was pointed out in Providence W. 1m. Co. v.
Hotel Marysville, 60 Cal.App.2d 338, 348 [140 P.2d 698],
section 14 of the Civil Code provide~ that "writing includes
printing and typewriting."
In the Providence W. Ins. Co. v. Hotel Mat'ystliUe case,·
mpra, it clearly appear:. that the plaintiff was given a bra..~,
check with which to claim his sample cases. It also there
appears that plaintiff knew that the hotel had envelopes with
the same type of check attached as the "B" check here and
which he might mal,e m.e of if he desired to impOSt! greater
liability upon the inn){eeper. It would seem that it should
be very apparent to everyone thnt the "B" check was the only
type of receipt within the contemplation of the parties, and
that no other type of receipt would have been given in any
event. Under the majority holding, no bailor may recover 1
more than $250 for property of whatever value unless he
demands something equivalent to an affidavit from the bailee.
The majority opinion states that "It bears emphasis that
section 1860 does not guarantee a minimum recovery of $250
in every case in which property depol'lited in a hotel safe is
lost. Section 1840 limits the liability of the depository to the
amount it 'is informed by the depositor, or has reason to suppose, the thing deposited to be worth. t t, Section 1840 reads
in full as follows: "The liability of a depositary for taeg'tigenee cannot exceed the amount which he is informed by
the depositor, or hac; reason to suppose, the thing deposited
to be worth." [Emph8.flis added.] Thus, it is only where the
loss is occasioned through negligence that section 1840 ap- .
plies. In the instant case, the plaintiff was precluded, because the motion for summary judgment was granted, from a
trial on the merits. The defendant, as depositary, was under
a duty to account for its failure to return the goods. (George
v. Bekins Van ~ Storage Co., 33 Ca1.2d 834 [205 P.2d 1037] ;
CUS8eft v. Southern California Satl. Bank, 133 Cal. 534 [65 P.
1099,85 Am.St.Rep. 221] ; 13 So.Cal.L.Rev. 164.)
I am of the opinion that a summary judgment was improper
in that a triable issue was presented, that is, whether the "B"
check constituted a receipt in writing as contemplated by section 1860 of the Civil Code (United States Fidelify • 6t1t1r•
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CO. V•• Sullivan, 93 Cal.App.2d 559, 561 [209 P.2d 429]),
and the judgment should be reversed.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-l concur in the conclusion
reached b:' Mr. Justice Carter. On the record, for the purposes of this appeal, it must be deemed admitted that defendant, as a bailee for hire, received from plaintiff's assignor
(hereinafter called plaintiff) an envelope containing $5,500,
and that subsequently plaintiff demanded and defendant refused to return the subject of the bailment. Furthermore,
a receipt in writing prepared by defendant was given to plaintiff. Under these circumstances the burden devolved upon the
defendant bailee to return the bailed property or to exculpate
itself for its failure so to do (see George v. Bekins Van &
Storage Co. (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 834, 840-841 [205 P.2d 1037] ;
lJowney v. Marlin Aircraft Service (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d
94, 99 [214 P.2d 581]; U Drive cf Tou,r, Ltd. v. System
Auto. Parks, Ltd. (1937), 28 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 782, 784 [71
P.2d 354]) and a summary judgment on defendant's motion
limiting its liability to $250 was improper.

